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Project background 
Our starting point for this project is: Effluent management in dense, low-income urban areas in Indonesia is 
challenging. Local (community) scale systems offer an affordable way to manage the public health and 
environmental hazards of untreated wastewater in urban areas. However, in order to operate in the long-
term, these systems need effective governance, defined as (Ross et al, 2014): 
 
Finding pathways towards effective governance is especially timely. Reviews of local scale systems in 
Indonesia found that effective governance is difficult to achieve and the service does not always last as 
planned (Eales et al. 2013). In addition, connection numbers are as low as half of what was planned (Mitchell 
et al. 2015). Nonetheless, the Government of Indonesia has committed to local scale wastewater systems as 
a key component of its commitment to provide 100% of its citizens with access to sanitation. To date, about 
13,600 of these systems have been funded for installation, and as many as 100,000 more are needed to 
meet current targets for access (Mitchell et al. 2015).  
In response to this situation, the Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) at the University of Technology 
Sydney (UTS) developed a three-year transdisciplinary action research project that seeks to improve the 
long-term governance of local scale wastewater services in Indonesia.  
This project is a research partnership with the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning 
(BAPPENAS), and is conducted in collaboration with AKSANSI (Association of community based organisations 
for sanitation), Bremen Overseas Research and Development Association (BORDA) Germany, Center for 
Regulation Policy and Governance at Universitas Ibn Khaldun Bogor and the UK Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI).  A Project Advisory Group (with members from seven Ministries and six international donors) 
provides guidance and validation for the research. The 2014-2016 study is supported by the Australian 
Development Research Awards Scheme (ADRAS).  
The four enquiry areas for this project are: 
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Executive summary   
As part of a larger three year study, this contextual analysis of barriers to city (kota) local government 
supporting local scale wastewater systems found positive components of local government supporting the 
long-term sustainability of local scale systems. However, the following themes present potential challenges 
for local scale system governance: 
 Unclear national public finance rules make it difficult to financially support the operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of local scale wastewater services.  
 Fear of sanctions around misuse of public finance makes government hesitant to fund O&M of local 
scale systems.  
 The information deficit around the performance of local scale systems is a symptom of weak oversight 
systems, leaving local government unable to a) determine which community based organisations 
(Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat - KSMs) responsible for operating the local scale systems are 
performing poorly or failing and b) initiate corrective action. However, more speculatively, may the 
information deficit also be a disincentive for local government to improve its oversight? As long as the 
data remains unconsolidated, the problem of local scale system failure remains largely invisible.  
 Unclear legal arrangements for ownership of the land and system make it challenging for KSMs to access 
funds, and potentially to retain their land after construction investment.  
 The prevalence of the community empowerment norm means that local government is more likely to 
leave most if not all O&M responsibilities to the KSMs.  
Assuming that systematically increasing local government support is necessary for effective governance of 
local scale services, the following recommendations could be relevant:  
1. Encourage local government entities to allocate skills and functions for sanitation planning, 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation to particular responsibilities areas or Bidang. This can be 
done without being prescriptive - for example, by underscoring that expertise in public financial 
management procedures is an important capability of the funding Bidang – and needs to be available to 
a Pokja Sanitasi (sanitation working group), whether it is specifically filled by local government finance 
department (BPKAD) (or its equivalent) or not. 
2. Increase the space for local government to experiment with post-construction funding for local scale 
systems, e.g. by providing specific guidance to counter fear of sanction for misuse of public funds.  
3. Recognise the politics inherent in performance monitoring, i.e. that local government may be hesitant to 
expose the full extent of failure through robust outcome monitoring, evaluation and reporting, because 
it will increase the pressure on them to act. Where this is the case, create positive incentives for 
monitoring e.g. by creating an award (or financial reward) system for regencies and cities that achieve 
high standards of local scale system effluent.  
4. There are currently challenges with legally entrusting ownership with either KSMs or local government. 
However, local government should explore options to reduce the risk of rent-seeking (ie using local scale 
systems to obtain economic gain from others without reciprocation) in relation to unclear ownership 
arrangements of land or technology. 
5. Approach local government assumptions around community empowerment respectfully – recognising 
that while local government appears to be using a normative position on community empowerment 
(which results in side-stepping responsibility for failing local scale services), it may not be a conscious 
decision for many actors involved. In the face of deep-rooted norms, an open, joint discussion could be 
helpful about the appropriate balance of responsibility between KSMs, local government, and other 
actors involved in local scale service sustainability.  
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This working paper summarises the findings of a two week field study in one city in Indonesia. We recognise this 
kind of rapid external enquiry is likely to miss details and misinterpret local nuances. We also recognise that one 
city can only be indicative rather than representative. However, we hope the insights presented are valuable to 




Purpose of legal arrangements component of the research 
The legal arrangements component of this research had two areas of enquiry in order to identify additional 
options for improved governance and management partnerships for local scale systems:  
1. A desktop review of the formal national and local legal frameworks that influence and constrain 
governance activities of local government and the community based organisations (KSMs) 
responsible for system operation and maintenance (conducted with the Center for Policy Regulation 
and Governance at UIKB). 
2. A contextual analysis of one case study city to understand the formal and informal limits to, and 
prospects for, local governments in Indonesia to contribute to governance for local scale systems.  
This paper concerns the second part only of the legal arrangements enquiry. The main audience for this 
working paper is predominantly sanitation practitioners and specialists working in Indonesia. However, the 
findings may also be of interest to stakeholders of local scale sanitation implementation in other countries.  
Our accompanying report on the review of national and local legal frameworks further elucidates many of 
the themes highlighted here.  
Key research questions of contextual analysis 
The overarching question is: Does local government struggle to support the long-term sustainability of local 
scale systems? If so, why? 
In attempting to answer this question, the analysis and discussion are framed against several sub-questions, 
providing the overall structure to this document. 
RQ1: Framing/ scene setting: To what extent is the case study local government supporting the long-
term sustainability of local scale services? 
RQ2: Findings of the institutional arrangements in the specific case study: What are the 
institutional arrangements (primarily at local government level) for supporting sustainable local scale 
wastewater services? 
RQ3: Discussion and synthesis that considers institutional arrangements for local scale systems in 
broader terms: What underlying dynamics could be conditioning the institutional arrangements and 
potential outcomes? 
RQ4: Arising questions for potential ways forward: What options are available to work with and 
around these dynamics in favour of institutional arrangements that can support sustainable local 
scale services? 
Methodology 
Data was gathered through key informant interviews, conducted individually and in small groups in February 
2015. The majority of interviews were conducted in the case study city, with Pemda (local government) 
officials, members of KSMs, and civil society representatives. Field findings were reflected, discussed, and 
supplemented with a selection of interviewees in a final roundtable session. Documentary evidence was also 
collated and reviewed before and after fieldwork. 
Two theoretical frameworks underpin the analysis. Firstly, characterisation of the institutional arrangements 
is informed by Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and 
colleagues (Ostrom 2011). Analysis of underlying incentives, relationships and power dynamics conditioning 
institutional arrangements is further informed by ODI’s work on The Politics of Public Goods and Services 
(Harris and Wild 2013) and the particular characteristics of sectors that condition service delivery outcomes 
(Harris et al. 2013). 
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Findings 
RQ1: To what extent is the case study local government supporting the long-term 
sustainability of local scale services? 
The majority position of local government stakeholders is that KSMs have the lead responsibility for all 
post-construction management and O&M tasks. Assumptions around community self-reliance (the ability 
to sustain local scale services unsupported) appear deep-rooted and widespread. Most operational tasks are 
left to KSMs, implicitly or explicitly. 
In terms of financial and technical resources from local government in support of priority operational 
tasks (desludging, optimisation, and major repair): desludging and optimisation have recently received 
very modest financial and technical support. In addition to funds allocated for sludge hand carts, c.IDR 
500M ($35K USD)i was allocated in 2015 to support extension of mains for local scale systems as part of an 
optimisation drive. The UPTD (technical unit of local government), which sits under the DKP (local 
government department of cleaning and landscaping), also reported undertaking post-construction social 
facilitation activities with four KSMs in 2014 with a focus on behaviour change and increasing 
connections/optimisation (a further five are planned for 2015). 
RQ2+3: What are the institutional arrangements (primarily at local government level) 
for supporting sustainable local scale wastewater services? What underlying 
dynamics could be conditioning the institutional arrangements and potential 
outcomes? 
Institutional arrangements are summarised in this section according to: 
A. Actors: Which actors are involved in operating, managing, financing and utilising local scale systems in 
the case study city?  
B. Local government relationships: What are the key positions actors can occupy, and what authority and 
autonomy do these positions confer? How do positions interrelate? 
C. Information available: What information is available to the actors to allow them to discharge their roles? 
What information asymmetries exist? 
D. Allowable actions: What formal and informal factors govern the ability of actors to discharge their roles 
in relation to local scale service? 
E. Benefits and costs: What are the benefits and costs to local government from the current situation? 
F. Potential outcomes: What are the potential outcomes of the current configuration of actors, positions, 
information, actions, and costs and benefits? 
Note: insights from the third research question “What underlying dynamics could be conditioning the 
institutional arrangements and potential outcomes?” are interwoven into this section, next to the 
corresponding topic that they elaborate.  
A. Actors 
There are many actors involved, from national to local level government, to NGOs. The Sekda (local 
government secretary) is engaged, e.g. as chairman of Pokja Sanitasi. Upcoming regional by-law will be a key 
test of interest of local parliamentarians, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) in sanitation, and 
willingness to support a more conducive legislative environment. Two civil society NGOs, the Healthy City 
Forum or Forum Kota Sehat (FKS) and AKSANSI, are active in supporting the construction and management 
of, respectively, local scale systems.  
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B. Local government positions 
Three important positions, or arrangements, for local government in relation to local scale systems are 
relationships between:  
1. Local government work units, or Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPDs) (i.e. such as the:  
 Development Planning Agency, Bappeda;  
 Finance department, Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset Daerah (BPKAD);  
 Department of building and housing supervision, Wasbangkim 
2. Local government and higher levels of government 
3. Local government and NGOs.  
Relationship between SKPDs (local government work units) 
For the case study city, it appears that the functional allocation of responsibilities (Bidang) for the Pokja 
Sanitasi according to national guidance SE660 from the Ministry of Home Affairs is being followed to some 
extent, including for the local scale wastewater subsector within sanitation generally.  
For local scale service specifically, in practice responsibilities for several ‘bidang’ appear to be shared and in 
transition. Perhaps more importantly, standardised procedures and criteria seem to be lacking for 
determining when and how each of the involved work units should intervene to support a KSM with post-
construction challenges. This is most notable in relation to Bidang Monitoring dan Evaluasi, where at least 
two SKPD are collecting data that could be used to assess local scale system performance, but there does 
not yet appear to be a systematic approach to city-wide data analysis and use in prioritising the limited 
post-construction support available. Our research spans eight cities across Java and Sulawesi, and none of 
these have coordinated data systems yet, but one city has recognized the need and opportunity. 
UNDERLYING DYNAMIC: Uncertainty of options for routing public finance may prevent local government 
from supporting the sustainability of local-scale systems 
In the case study city, the Pokja Sanitasi appears well-established. Capacity for collective action around 
locally identified problems certainly appeared to be present, exemplified by the Pokja instigating the new 
regional by-law on wastewater. Bappeda’s leadership has been important, but the interactions observed 
within the Pokja did not appear unduly hierarchical – indicating that there is a willingness to collaborate that 
goes beyond obligations. 
One particular aspect of Pokja arrangements, however, appears to inhibit local government’s ability to 
explore financial innovation around post-construction support for local scale services: the limited 
involvement, to date, of BPKAD, the finance Dinas or department.  
MoHA’s SE660 guidance attempts to provide clarity for sanitation service planning and development by 
delineating clear roles, including for funding.  While BPKAD does not have authority over budget allocation 
decisions, BPKAD is the key Dinas for reporting on expenditure and advising on spending rules.  
BPKAD played a visible role in our final workshop, in clarifying the official rules regarding what types of 
expenditure local government funds (APBD) could be used for – in a manner which implied that 
representatives from other local government work units (SKPD) were unsure of the ‘rules of the game’ for 
public financial management and reporting.  
As such, the absence of a key Dinas from the main institutional arrangement for sector coordination (the 
Pokja Sanitasi) appears to be preventing a full understanding of what is permissible and possible, in terms of 
reforming local government approach to local scale services. This in turn prevents the local government in 
the case study city from exploiting windows of opportunity to support the sustainability of local-scale 
systems, should they arise. 
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The opportunities for improved coordination appear to be:  
 Between agencies with knowledge on financing (e.g. the city’s development planning agency 
Bappeda and financing agency BPKAD) and other local government agencies with sanitation 
responsibilities to ensure knowledge of the budgeting process and the options available for post 
construction support of local scale systems 
 Between agencies responsible for monitoring and evaluation (e.g. local department of health 
(Dinkes) and environment (BPLH) and planning (Bappeda)) to ensure data collected is evaluated 
and effectively linked back to decision making (particularly around which local scale facilities most 
urgently need support) 
 Within different agencies with technical responsibilities (e.g. the department of building and 
housing supervision Wasbangkim and the department of cleaning/hygiene and landscaping DKP) 
to ensure support on different post-construction technical and implementation issues is joined up 
and recent transfers of responsibility are consolidated 
 Within different agencies responsible for communication and empowerment (e.g department of 
health Dinkes and DKP) to ensure consistent and systematic post-construction support for the 
‘software’ side. While this area of responsibility under SE660 (Bidang) was widely referenced in the 
course of interviews, it is still the one least understood. Current efforts do not appear to be targeted 
on the basis of need and involve multiple agencies in apparently ad-hoc responses to a limited 
number of (better performing) KSMs. 
Note:  This research found the case study city was using the SE660 to a certain extent to plan and implement 
sanitation, and thus we have captured it here. It is outside the scope of this report to comment on the 
broader strengths of SE660 (i.e. identifies areas for action, offers strong leadership with requiring the 
regional secretary, SEKDA, to lead) and challenges of SE660 (i.e. creates confusion with Pokja Sanitasi and 
Pokja AMPL (drinking water and environmental sanitation) (Chong et al. 2015) and how national government 
is considering changes to bring water and sanitation into alignment, which may bring future changes to 
these different Pokjas.  
Relationship between local government and higher levels of government 
Looking ahead, Provinsi (Provincial Government) is now rolling out the SABERMAS programme (similar to 
SANIMAS) funded from provincial budget. SABERMAS aims to complement kota and kabupaten-level 
construction of local scale facilities in response to government targets (including new 2020 ‘100-0-100’ 
target1). The program has a sizeable budget (IDR 2.4 trillion budget in 2014 (USD 170 M), likely to rise to IDR 
3 T (USD 214M) next year) but divided across many cities (kota) and regencies (kabupaten).  
This increasing funding stream is likely to increase challenges in terms of coordination and authority for any 
kota/ kabupaten who will need to manage SABERMAS alongside other programmes (the case study city has 
received one SABERMAS facility to date). 
Relationship between local government and NGOs 
Both FKS and AKSANSI play a role in supporting local scale systems in the operation and maintenance phase. 
FKS is the local manifestation of a national program focused on healthy cities. AKSANSI is a national NGO 
whose sole purpose is to support the operational phase of local scale wastewater, and has formal branches 
in more than 25 kota and kabupaten, including in the case study city. There was confusion among some 
interviewees as to the relationship between AKSANSI and FKS, but the two organisations are independent.  
                                                          
1  The ‘100 -0-100 target’ in Indonesia refers to: 100 percent of drinkable clean water, 0 percent of slum areas and 
100 percent of sanitation by the end of 2019 - See more at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/25/ri-
calls-more-robust-efforts-tackle-settlement-problems.html#sthash.DOkKKDT6.dpuf  
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A remaining question for local government is if and how to help resource, finance or partner formally with 
AKSANSI or other relevant organisations to perform these roles.  
C. The information available 
Whilst monitoring mechanisms are reportedly in place to track outcome level data (effluent quality tests by 
BPLH (local environment agency) and health impacts (collated by health department from clinics and 
hospitals) there does not appear to be any systematic consolidation and evaluation of information for 
targeting support, planning and incentivising performance (e.g. which KSMs are most urgently in need of 
what kinds of support).  
D. The allowable actions 
Three groups of formal and informal factors appear to shape the ability of actors to discharge their roles in 
relation to local scale services:  
1. Rules and sanctions around public finance (see also our accompanying report on formal legal 
frameworks) 
2. Legal arrangements 
3. Socio-cultural norms e.g. around empowerment.  
What is ‘allowable’ appears important here: limited local government action to date may be to do with the 
perceived room for manoeuvre at the local level. Legal ownership, public financial rules and procedures, 
and norms like ‘community empowerment’ are all systemic issues that can appear implausible for a single 
city (Kota) to address (more so for any single local government work unit (SKPD), or individual within an 
SKPD).  
1. Rules and sanctions around public finance shape the ability of actors to support local scale systems.  
Procedural options for increasing regional budgetary allocations for local scale system O&M appear 
complex, and consequently under-explored. The disincentive to ‘try new things’ seems to stem from the 
challenges of engaging with the complexities of regional budgeting rules, and the severe sanctions for non-
compliance with those (uncertain) rules. 
Few stakeholders except BPKAD, the Dinas with specific responsibility for budgetary processing and 
reporting, had clear views on the bureaucratic options for freeing public funds for post-construction 
support. Public financial management processes are complex, unwieldy and opaque (see also the 
accompanying report on formal legal frameworks) – including the local government budget (APBD) process 
by which regional-level budgets are determined. Discussions around options for routing regional budget 
(APBD) towards local scale systems in the final consultation meeting in the case study site suggest that the 
basic procedural/ bureaucratic options are only partially understood by most of the involved local 
government work units (SKPD), with the exception of finance (BPKAD) and possibly planning (Bappeda) 
representatives on the Pokja Sanitasi.  
Financial innovation is furthermore inhibited by expectation of severe sanction for non-compliance with 
required procedures. Several local government officials reported that financial regulations and the drive 
against corruption act as a discouragement from innovating around financing arrangements for local scale 
systems in the post-construction phase. Allocating government funds to prohibited categories of 
expenditure can be treated as a criminal offence – for example, recurrent expenditure for assets not owned 
by government, such as local scale facilities.  
UNDERLYING DYNAMIC: The credibility of political commitments around corruption appear to be 
trumping those relating to sanitation. 
The rise in power and visibility of Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) over the last decade is 
emblematic of a broad political commitment made by the country’s leaders to tackle endemic government 
corruption.  
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For local government stakeholders in the case study city, the credibility of this political commitment is also 
very real – the threat of severe penalties, including custodial sentences, if found misusing public funds. 
Several respondents identified this as strongly dis-incentivising all spending on assets that are not clearly 
government-owned, including local scale facilities. 
Four further challenges can be highlighted in relation to the challenge of freeing up public finance for local 
scale systems at the regional level: 
Firstly, as a multi-sectoral issue, local scale systems would require significant coordination between the 
local government work units (SKPD) involved if it is to receive spending prioritisation. The local 
government budget (APBD) formulation involves the planning agency, Bappeda, preparing budget ceilings 
for each local government work unit (SKPD) (Cahyat 2011) (see also the accompanying report on formal legal 
frameworks). This implies an environment in which sectors that are not governed by a single SKPD (of which 
sanitation is a prime example) may lose out to the more direct sectoral priorities of the SKPD involved. For 
example, curative healthcare is likely to be a greater priority for Dinkes, in considering spending options 
within its specified budget ceiling, as compared to sanitation (note: this issue was not discussed with 
stakeholders and is surmised from the literature).  
Secondly, locally articulated spending priorities do not currently appear to emphasise sanitation, even if 
they can translate into the APBD. The Musrenbang, or multi stakeholder development planning 
consultation process, is meant to feed into the selection and prioritisation of SKPD work-plans and thence 
the Annual Local Government Work Plan (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daera - RKPD) from which the APBD is 
developed. A number of case study stakeholders argued that sectors such as roads were more likely to 
receive budgetary and political attention than sanitation – it is not clear therefore that increasing KSM 
mobilisation around the Musrenbang process would secure more financial resources for post-construction 
support. Cahyat (2011) is also sceptical of the transparency of the process following the Musrenbang, and 
indeed of the ability of Musrenbang-identified priorities to make it through to the APBD at all. 
Thirdly, information regarding transfers for central government tends to come late in the regional 
budgeting process, and can result in a two stage process where the initial outline for the RKPD is 
substantially revised.ii Where there is expectation of allocations from the central level it may further reduce 
the incentives for regional-level stakeholders to mobilise themselves to secure resources from the APBD. 
This issue was not discussed with stakeholders in the case study city, but given the prominence of central 
government funds in meeting the construction costs of local scale facilities - under DAK (national budget’s 
special allocation fund) - and PU-funded programmes - it may be worth investigating further. 
Finally, the APBD is a fairly static and linear instrument, once approved. Revisions to SKPD budget 
implementation lists (Daftar Pelaksanaan Anggaran – DPA) require the entire APBD to be revised and should 
be approved by the regional legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah DPRD), although changes within 
the same expenditure category can be approved by the Sekda (Cahyat 2011). The accompanying work on 
formal legal frameworks will shed more light on this.  
2. Legal arrangements shape the ability of actors to support local scale systems. 
Land and asset ownership concerning local scale facilities remains unclear in law; reliance on grants made by 
owners and witnessed by various officials including kelurahan (urban village) head are likely to be legally 
contestable. Although interviewees did not highlight any examples of where legal challenges to asset or land 
ownership had been made, an upcoming test-case will be critical - concerning whether the original land 
owner or KSM should be paid in compensation for a local scale facility that is to be demolished to make way 
for a road. 
Formal legal documentation of ownership (e.g. acta hibah) requires KSM to be registered as a legal entity 
and can be expensive (our research in other cities suggests around IDR 5M ($350 USD)).  
Legal transfer of ownership to the KSM could further restrict ability of government funds to be allocated to 
post-construction capital maintenance expenditure, under current rules.  
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UNDERLYING DYNAMIC: Current ad-hoc legal ownership arrangements are open to rent seeking 
behaviours. 
The issue of legal ownership was only cursorily explored in this study, partly because of the range of other 
factors that seemed to be important. However, some observations can be made. The current approach 
makes communities the de facto owners of land for the specific purpose of local scale wastewater services 
(and therefore also the de facto owners of local scale assets built upon the land). Without a notary letter and 
formal acta hibah, however, communities are not owners in law (‘de iure’). At first sight, there seem to be 
sound reasons for this: the relatively informal arrangements are cheaper (avoiding notary fees for an acta 
hibah) and may be more palatable to land-owners than fully relinquishing title under law. However, two 
significant risks arise.  Firstly, the risk that the whole system can be lost if, for example, the land-owners (or 
perhaps their heirs) change their mind. Secondly, they also leave the potential for rent-seeking behaviour, 
where the productive value of the land increases due to the presence of the local scale facility and can be 
captured by the original owner. There were no confirmed instances of this happening, but the question 
marks over whether an original landowner might be compensated for both land and local scale assets 
demolished to make way for a road, suggest the potential for the issue to arise. This said, entrusting de iure 
ownership for local scale system land and facilities to government was not viewed as an attractive 
proposition for land-owners; the option of formalising de iure ownership with KSMs or communities is also 
likely to constrain funding options, as long as regulations on public finance prohibit local government 
spending on O&M for assets it does not own. The accompanying work on legal frameworks will shed more 
light on this issue. 
3. Socio-cultural norms shape the ability of actors to support local scale systems.  
Local scale service development was frequently associated with the ideal of ‘community empowerment’. 
This concept appears to be embedded in a set of norms around what the state should and should not 
support.  
The ‘community empowerment’ concept can be interpreted in a number of different ways – as a means to 
build sustainability of facilities by enhancing community ownership; as a way to reduce public costs; as way 
to strengthen social/ community structures. 
Associating a programme or investment with ‘community empowerment’ has important practical 
ramifications. In particular, like the expenditure category, it appears to discourage routine public spending 
on post-construction capital costs, such as major repairs for local scale facilities. At the feedback workshop, 
there was general agreement among attending SKPD that it was appropriate for communities to seek funds 
for major repairs on an ad-hoc basis through social assistance grants (bantung sosial) – requiring 
communities to identify and articulate their own needs. There was, however, some recognition that this can 
be challenging especially given bantung sosial are requested and issued in separate financial years, which 
could leave a community without a functioning sewage management system for a year or more. 
UNDERLYING DYNAMIC: Prevalence of the community empowerment norm. Part 1. 
The community empowerment concept may persist around local scale services because of perceptions 
concerning the nature of the good that are common in the sanitation sector.   
Local scale services, like sanitation services everywhere, are nominally rival (e.g. they have a fixed design 
capacity, and one person’s use diminishes the availability of the service for others) and excludable (e.g. it is 
difficult/ impossible to connect without approval of KSM). In this pure economic sense it is legitimate to 
perceive local scale services as a private good, which should in turn permit KSMs to successfully meet their 
O&M costs through user fees. This perception of course chooses to ignore the merit qualities of local scale 
services, the fact that they rarely operate at design capacity (and so are not rivalrous) and most importantly, 
the fact that adequate sanitation in densely populated areas is fundamental to protecting the whole 
community’s health – that is, there are high externalities associated with failing local scale services. All these 
factors could be used to justify public intervention. These rarified technical economic concepts are not used 
in practice to articulate the idea that communities should be responsible for managing local scale services. 
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 It is, however, important to recognise that there is a school of thought in the international development 
sector, particularly at the first steps on the sanitation ladder, that treats sanitation as a private good that 
should not be subsidised – evident in CLTS policies including Indonesia’s STBM programme.  
 
UNDERLYING DYNAMIC: Prevalence of the community empowerment norm. Part 2. 
The community empowerment concept may persist because of task-related and demand characteristics, 
which in principle might be expected to allow for self-organisation. 
The persistence of the community empowerment norm can also plausibly be attributed to the ways in which 
users experience the service, and the prestige involved in fulfilling tasks around the service. The strength and 
persistence of the community empowerment norm also provides local government with something of a 
justification for inaction on local scale service sustainability issues.  
Firstly, local scale services exhibit high territoriality: they are experienced in common by a defined group of 
users living near to one another, and the facility. This means that problems, where they are noticed, may be 
experienced in common by all users (for example, most households in the relatively small area served by the 
local scale system will be affected by smell or backed up mains pipework). A contrast can be made with 
healthcare, which often involves users with diverse needs and limited common cause, who may have 
travelled from some distance to use a clinic or hospital, often on an ad-hoc basis. Where users experience 
problems in common and regularly interact, there might be expected to be higher chance of collaboration to 
find ways to address those problems. 
The second characteristic is (local) visibility. This varies greatly, depending on the type of system, and its 
operational status. Shared public toilets and washing buildings (MCKs) can be highly visible at community 
scale – where they function well, KSMs and local elites may gain prestige from their successful ongoing 
operation. Again, this might be expected to be conducive to community-based management. However, 
where they fall into disrepair, a vicious cycle may ensue. For local sewerage systems, there is no visibility, so 
no trigger for a need for community management.  
These factors begin to demonstrate the complexity of the socio-technical system that is local scale 
sanitation, and show why the default assumption within local government, that KSMs should meet all (or 
nearly all) post-construction costs, is problematic when applied as a general approach.  
 
E. Benefits and costs 
Currently, local government appears to be able to ignore the externalised costs (health and environmental 
impacts of ineffective treatment), which arise from not investing in local scale services. The scale of system 
failure is as yet un-quantified and largely invisible – limited sanctions from above or complaints from below. 
Consequently, there are not many personal or corporate incentives to invest in addressing a problem that 
hasn’t yet been widely noticed. In this context, local government may perceive that deferring the vast 
majority of post-construction responsibilities for local scale services to KSMs is a ‘low-cost’ option. 
Addressing the factors mentioned above (‘allowable actions, control over choice’) would require significant 
individual effort, and in most cases collective action involving several local government administrations 
working with civil society organisations, to make a strong case to national level government for regulatory 
reform and additional budget allocations.  
In the short term (see Figure 1), local government avoids the ‘pinch-point’ of Indonesia’s sanitation targets 
on the one hand, and the ability of communities to manage the local scale systems once built, by deferring 
the vast majority of post-construction responsibilities and costs to KSMs. Local government’s avoidance of 
the ‘pinch’, by deferring responsibility for local scale service sustainability onto KSMs (and NGOs) may not be 
part of a conscious strategy for individuals within the system. 
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This works so long as the inability of communities to manage local scale services remains invisible – which it 
does, while performance monitoring remains weak and systems are relatively young. 
 
Figure 1 Local government may avoid the short term pinch point 
Long term, however, local government may be caught in the pinch of broader expectations (see Figure 2): 
decentralisation policies which leave them as perceived guarantor of local service delivery, and their visible 
role in local scale service construction. This means that local government may struggle to avoid blame for 
system failure, and needs to think strategically about how it can support systems in the long-term. 
 
Figure 2 Local government may be caught in the pinch of broader expectations 
 
UNDERLYING DYNAMIC: The information deficit can be a disincentive for oversight. Unconsolidated 
information on performance is not only a symptom, but also a cause, of weak oversight systems from local 
government to operational levels.   
On the face of it, the information deficit around the rate of local scale service failure is a symptom of weak 
oversight systems, leaving local government unable to determine which KSMs are failing, and to take 
supportive corrective action. However, more cynically, the information deficit can also be viewed as a cause 
of weak oversight systems, or at least a disincentive for local government to overhaul its oversight. As long 
as the data remains unconsolidated – and effectively ‘lost’ within the local government bureaucratic 
machinery – the problem of local scale service failure remains largely invisible. A strong oversight system 
based on regularly collected performance data would likely increase the ‘pinch’ on local government to act 
to actively support KSMs, while in the short term, the information deficit allows them to continue with the 
status-quo. As such, there is little incentive for local government to collect and use performance monitoring 
data more systematically. 
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F. Potential outcomes 
As discussed above, what is ‘allowable’ appears important here: limited local government action to date may 
be to do with the perceived room for manoeuvre at the local level because of perception and implications of 
legal ownership, public financial rules and procedures, and norms like ‘community empowerment’. In view 
of this, plausible outcomes include:   
 Local government provides no/ minimal support to local scale service sustainability: Continuation of 
low-level equilibrium/ deterioration of local scale systems until failure becomes visible (e.g. through 
disease outbreak) and higher level of government intervenes. Our research suggests this is the most 
likely situation. 
 Local government provides modest support on those issues which currently seem ‘allowable’: 
Tinkering with status quo, with a focus on specific operational responsibilities. Our research would 
suggest this is the likely outcome in regencies (kabupaten) and cities (kota) that are recipients of 
support from IUWASH or the Australia-funded sanitation programme SAIIG.  
 Local government takes the initiative to rethink what is ‘allowable’: Seizing windows of opportunity 
at the local level to tackle more systemic issues in the institutional arrangements. Our research has 
revealed one city in Sulawesi that is already moving in this direction. 
RQ4: What options are available to work with and around these dynamics, in favour 
of institutional arrangements that can support sustainable local scale services? 
Key challenges within the institutional arrangements for local scale systems could be summarised as: 
 Unclear rules around public finance 
 Fear of sanctions around misuse of public finance 
 Information deficit and disincentive for oversight 
 Unclear legal arrangements for ownership 
 Prevalence of the community empowerment norm 
The investigation of underlying factors suggests that the following recommendations could be relevant, 
assuming that systematically increasing local government support to local scale services is viewed as 
prerequisite for the proposed management arrangements. 
1. Encourage local government entities to consider the allocation of skills and functions implied by 
MoHA SE660 guidance (across Bidang). This can be done without being prescriptive – for example, 
by underscoring that expertise in public financial management procedures is an important capability 
of the funding Bidang – and needs to be available to a Pokja Sanitasi, whether it is specifically filled 
by BPKAD (or its equivalent) or not. 
2. Increase the space for local government to experiment with funding post-construction services, e.g. 
by providing specific guidance to counter fear of sanction for misuse of public funds. A relevant 
comparison here may be the water supply and sanitation sector in Sri Lankaiii, where similar 
tendencies to focus on new capital works in place of O&M and rehabilitation have been exhibited. 
Here, sector technocrats and engineers have nonetheless been able to push back and convince 
political actors to adopt less politically visible but more sensible strategies (Mcloughlin and Harris 
2013). 
3. Recognise the politics inherent in performance monitoring – that local government may be unwilling 
to expose the full extent of failure through robust outcome monitoring, evaluation and reporting, 
because it will increase the pressure on them to act. Where this is the case, create positive 
incentives for monitoring e.g. by creating an award (or financial reward) system for regencies and 
cities that achieve high standards of local scale system effluent.  
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4. Explore options to reduce the risk of rent-seeking in relation to unclear ownership arrangements, 
while recognising that there are currently challenges with legally entrusting ownership with either 
KSMs or local government. 
5. Approach local government assumptions around community empowerment gently – recognising 
that while local government appears to be using a normative position on community empowerment 
to side-step responsibility for failing local scale services, it may not be a conscious decision for many 
actors involved. In the face of deep-rooted norms, an open debate is needed about the 
appropriate balance of responsibility between KSMs, local government, and other actors involved 
in local scale service sustainability. In initiating this process, it will be important to ensure 
consideration of the size and distribution of externalised costs of failing services. ODI’s experience in 
working on difficult WASH policy areas in Ethiopia, through facilitated exchanges of researchers and 
policy makers, suggests that change can be achieved even in relatively hierarchical bureaucracies, 
by working transparently and with a strong evidence base at multiple levels. Achievements include 
unlocking significantly increased budgets to local resources for O&M for water points. These 
approaches nonetheless require a significant investment of time and resources, and strong 
facilitation (ODI et al. 2011). 
 12 
References 
Bappeda (2012) Strategi Sanitasi Kota (SSK) 2010 -2014 (Edisi Revisi 2013-2017). Bappeda, Kota (Case study city). 
Cahyat, A. (2011) Guidebook to local governments in Indonesia (Draft September 2011), GIZ 
Chong J, Abeysuriya K, Hidayat L, Sulistio H, Ross K and Willetts J (2015). Strengthening governance arrangements 
for small city and town sanitation. Report prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of 
Technology Sydney, Kemitraan Partnership for Governance Reform and SNV Indonesia for the Australian Aid 
Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative (IndII).  
Eales, K., Blackett, I., Siregar, R., and Febriani, E. (2013) Review of Community-Managed Decentralized 
Wastewater Treatment Systems in Indonesia. Washington D.C.: World Bank Water and Sanitation Program 
Harris, D., Mcloughlin, C. and Wild, L. (2013) The technical is political: why understanding the political implications 
of technical characteristics can help improve service delivery. London: Overseas Development Institute 
Harris, D. and Wild, L. (2013) Finding solutions: making sense of the politics of service delivery. London: Overseas 
Development Institute 
IUWASH (2013) Institutional Capacity Building for UPTD PAL: An Innovative Approach for Centralized Wastewater 
Management in Case study City, USAID 
Mason, N., Batley, R. and Harris, D. (2014) The technical is political: understanding the political implications of 
sector characteristics for the delivery of sanitation services. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Mcloughlin, C. and Harris, D. (2013) The politics of progress on water and sanitation in Colombo, London: 
Overseas Development Institute 
MoHA (2012) Pedoman Pengelolaan Program Percepatan Pemuangunan Sanitasi Permukiman (PPSP) di Daerah. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Jakarta  
Mitchell, C, Ross, K, Abeysuriya, K, Puspowardoyo, P, Wedahuditama, F. 2015. Effective governance for the 
successful long-term operation of community scale air limbah systems: Mid-term observations report. Prepared 
by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney, as part of the Australian Development 
Research Award Scheme.  
ODI, International Water and Sanitation Centre, WaterAid, Hararghe Catholic Secretariat, Insittute of 
Development Studies, Addis Ababa University (2011) Beyond the Water Point: Linking research, policy and 
practice for sustainable water supply and sanitation in Ethiopia. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Ostrom, E. (2011) Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Studies Journal, 
39(1), 7-27. 
Ram, P.K., Sahli, M.W., Arnold, B., Colford, J.M., Chase, C., Briceño B., Orsola-Vidal A., and Gertler, P. (2014) 
Validity of Rapid Measures of Handwashing Behavior: An Analysis of Data from Multiple Impact Evaluations in the 
Global Scaling Up Handwashing Project. WSP Technical Paper. Water and Sanitation Program: Washington, DC. 
USDP (2014) PPSP 2010 – 2014: Implementation Issues and Recommendations. Urban Sanitation Development 
Program, Jakarta. 
Wild and Cammack (2013) The supply and distribution of essential medicines in Malawi. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
WSP (2011) Lessons in Urban Sanitation Development. Indonesia Sanitation Sector Development Program 2006-
2010. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Water and Santiation Program 
  
 13 
Appendix 1. Summary of responsibility areas (Bidang) 
Planning (Bidang perencanaan): Responsibilities for planning in the case study city clearly fall to Bappeda. 
Interviewees either endorsed or did not question Bappeda’s de facto authority within the Pokja Sanitasi. The 
influential position occupied by Bappeda appears to flow from its general coordinating role for SKPD, as 
highlighted by Cahyat (2011). 
Funding (Bidang Pendanaan): For funding responsibility, the SE660 guidance stipulates roles including 
inputting on policies and regulations and financial reporting in relation to sanitation (see also our 
accompanying report on formal legal frameworks). In practice in the case study city, it appears that Bappeda 
(local planning department) and BPKAD (local finance and asset management agency) share the related 
roles– the former is leading the process to draft a new regional bylaw regulation on sanitation, while the 
latter fulfils its generic responsibilities with regards to managing financial disbursements and reporting.  
BPKAD does not, however, appear to be a regular member of the Pokja Sanitasi. For example, the final 
workshop organised for the field trip was regarded as a rare opportunity for the core SKPD working on 
sanitation to consult BPKAD on budgeting restrictions - e.g. prohibition on allocating regional budget (APBD) 
to upkeep of facilities not owned by government. Their involvement in the final feedback meeting for the 
field study suggested that they are viewed as an important stakeholder, particularly by Bappeda 
representatives. BPKAD’s understanding of financial systems, including the budgeting process, 
disbursement and reporting rules, is likely to be instrumental in determining viable options for public 
funds in support of local scale service. 
Technical (Bidang Teknis): Technical responsibilities for sanitation planning and development have shifted 
recently in the case study city, with the establishment of the dedicated technical office within the local 
government department of building and housing supervision, Wasbangkim, with responsibility and budget 
for water and sanitation, including local scale services. This follows the SE660 guidance, which recommends 
the bidang is headed by the SKPD (local government work unit) responsible for ‘settlements or public works’ 
(usually Dinas cipta karya or DPU).  
Representatives from the technical implementation unit for wastewater treatment (UPTD-PAL) under DKP 
(local government department of cleanliness) implied that they were previously the responsible entity for 
technical aspects of post-construction support for local scale facilities, which would fall under SE600’s 
Communication and empowerment area of responsibility (‘Bidang Penyehatah, Komunikasi dan 
Pemberdayaan’). The majority of interviewees explicitly or implicitly endorsed the new arrangement and 
viewed the establishment of the technical office within Wasbangkim as a positive step. IUWASH, a US-
funded development project, has provided substantial support to UPTD-PAL, yielding slow but steady 
progress in institutional form and capacity, particularly in relation to the central sewerage system and septic 
tanks.  
Given the recent flux around the Bidang Teknis ‘position’ (and reportedly has since continued since the 
conduct of this case study), coordination and a positive working relationship between Wasbangkim and 
UPTD-PAL will be important. Technical responsibilities for different aspects of sanitation are now effectively 
split. For example, UPTD-PAL manages the optimisation process for the IPAL, while Wasbangkim are now 
mandated and have a limited budget for optimisation of local scale facilities. More critically, the city’s 
sludge treatment facility (IPLT), under UPTD-PAL, remains the likely destination for septage from local scale 
facilities.   
Following a capacity building trip to a nearby city, UPTD-PAL purchased several desludging carts. The 
intention expressed by UPTD-PAL respondents was for these carts to be provided to KSMs free of charge. 
The main challenge is that the nearby city was on a floodplain, and therefore quite flat, whereas the case 
study city is in the hills, with high rainfall and quite steep terrain. The desludging carts are of very sturdy 
construction (steel), with a large tank for the sludge, and a pump to suck it out. The carts are therefore very 
heavy when empty, let alone when full, and will likely be quite challenging to manoeuvre.  The physical, 
technical, and financial arrangements around the use of the carts were unclear at the time of study.  
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Communication and empowerment (Bidang Penyehatan, Komunikasi dan Pemberdayaan): According to 
MoHA SE660, lead responsibility for Communication and empowerment should reside with the SKPD in 
charge of health. Dinkes (local department of health) representatives confirmed that their role in relation to 
local scale services extended to mobilisation and behaviour change, which they related to a broader 
leadership for promotion aspects across sanitation (e.g. via sanitarians under the community based total 
sanitation programme, STBM – Sanitasi Total Berbasis Masyarakat) and social and environmental health 
more generally (e.g. via the 10 point behaviour change programme PHBS - Perilaku Hidup Bersih dan Sehat). 
Several other interviewees nonetheless also claimed a major a role in relation to the software aspects of 
SANIMAS (community-based sanitation), including with existing KSMs, e.g. UPTD-PAL representatives 
reported undertaking post-construction ‘sosialisasi’ (socialisation) activities with 4 KSMs in 2014, with the 
same planned for a further 5 in 2015. When asked how KSMs were selected for such activities, UPTD-PAL 
representatives suggested that they targeted well-functioning KSMs on the basis of ‘readiness’, rather than 
those in greatest need. It should be noted that the implementation and underlying norms for this Bidang 
(and indeed for the term ‘sosialisasi’ which seems widely associated with this area) were insufficiently 
interrogated in the course of the study. NGOs including AKSANSI, BEST and FKS also appear to play a role, 
though we were not able to establish whether coordination between each of the parties involved was ad-
hoc or pre-arranged and under the leadership of a single agency. Certainly, Dinkes did not claim this 
leadership role nor did representatives of other organisations allude to this. 
Monitoring and evaluation (Bidang Monitoring dan Evaluasi): MoHA SE660 states that leadership for 
Monitoring and Evaluation should reside with the SKPD in charge of environmental issues – which in the 
case study city would imply a lead role for BPLH (local government department of environment). Interviews 
confirmed that BPLH undertakes annual monitoring of effluent quality from local scale facilities, with a focus 
on those with functioning KSMs. Responsibility for follow-up on the results of the monitoring was, 
however, unclear even for BPLH. According to the BPLH representative, effluent quality data are passed to 
Bappeda after which it may fall to Wasbangkim to follow-up on any KSMs falling below the required 
standard. In her view, this mirrored a wider gap in the institutional framework, in understanding where 
responsibility for addressing failure of local scale systems lies: Under regulation 54/2010 from MoHA 
(regulating obligatory and non-obligatory tasks at local government level) performance of wastewater is 
reportedly specified as the responsibility of PU or its equivalent SKPD, while environmental pollution is 
the responsibility of the environment Dinas. The implication for BPLH was that they could be sanctioned 
for local scale system failure but did not have the authority to address those failures by directly engaging 
KSMs.  
Dinkes representatives also emphasised that they had an important role to play in terms of monitoring, both 
for Reverse Osmosis (RO) water (which is provided by some KSMs and can be an important income 
generating opportunity) and collecting data on health status via community health centres. This was 
apparently analysed and shared with Bappeda but we found no evidence that it was being used to inform 
prioritisation of post-construction support to KSMs. 
Appendix 2. Glossary 
ABPD Local Government budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah)  
APBN National Government budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Nasional) 
BPKAD 
Local government finance department (Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset 
Daerah) 
Bappeda 
Local Government Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan dan 
Pembangunan Daerah) 
Bappenas 
National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional ) 
Bidang 
Responsibility areas (usually in this report in respect to SE660 guidance for 
sanitation planning 
BPLH Local Environmental Management Agency (Badan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup) 
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CBO Community-Based Organization  
Cipta Karya Directorate General of Human Settlements at Ministry of Public Works  
DAK Special allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus) 
Dinas Local government department 
DKP 
Local Government Department of Cleaning/Hygiene and Landscaping (Dinas 
Kebersihan dan Pertamanan) 
Dinas PU/ 
DPU 
Local Government Department of Public Works (Dinas Pekerjaan Umum) 
Dinkes Local Government Health Agency (Dinas Kesehatan) 
DPRD  Local Legislative/Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) 
FKS Healthy City Forum (Forum Kota Sehat) 
GoI Government of Indonesia  
IPAL Wastewater Treatment Plant (Instalasi Pengelolahan Air Limbah)  
IPLT Faecal Sludge Treatment Plant (Instalasi Pengolahan Limbah Tinja) 
IUWASH Indonesia Urban Water Sanitation and Hygiene Program, funded by USAID 
Kabupaten Regency local government  
KSM Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat (Community-based organisation, CBO) 
Kota City local government 
MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs 
NGO Non-Government Organization  
O&M Operation & Maintenance  
PD-PAL 
Local Government Wastewater Management Enterprise (Perusahaan Daerah 
Pengelolaan Air Limbah)  
PDAM Local Government Drinking Water Enterprise (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum)  
Pemda Local Government (Pemerintah Daerah)  
Perda Local Government Regulation/Decree (Peraturan Daerah)  
Pokja 
Sanitasi 
Working Group (Kelompok Kerja) for Sanitation 
PU Ministry of Public Works (Menteri Pekerjaan Umum) 
Provinsi Provincial government 
RKPD Annual Local Government Work Plan (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah) 
SAIIG Australia-Indonesia Infrastructure Grants for Municipal Sanitation Programme  
Sanimas Community-Based Sanitation (Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat)  
SE660 
Circular of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 660/4919/SJ on Guidelines for PPSP 
Management.  
Sekda Regional Secretary (Sekretaris Daerah) 
SKPD Local Government Work Unit (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah)  
STBM Community-Based Total Sanitation (Sanitasi Total Berbasis Masyarakat)  
UPTD 
Local Government Technical Implementation Unit (Unit Pelaksanaan Teknis 
Daerah) 
UPTD-PAL 
Local Government Technical Implementation Unit for wastewater treatment (Unit 
Pelaksanaan Teknis Daerah - Pengelolaan Air Limbah) 
USDP Urban Sanitation Development Programme  
Wasbangkim 
Local government department of building and housing supervision (Dinas 
Pengawasan Bangunan dan Permukiman) 
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i USD conversions of IDR are based on average exchange rates in September 2015 
ii http://journals.sfu.ca/ipmr/index.php/ipmr/article/viewFile/64/64  
iii
 http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8174.pdf  
Findings from an ODI case study of the water supply and sanitation sectors of Colombo indicate that:  
“Water and sanitation provision in Colombo are characterised by a low-level ‘settlement’, whereby arrangements 
for delivery sufficiently balance the incentives (economic, personal, professional) of users, politicians and 
bureaucrats, so the system becomes relatively stable and self-reinforcing.... Crucially, however, no actor is free 
from limitations on their behaviour: users face threats of disconnection or community-level sanction where CSOs 
are involved in mobilisation or monitoring (thus limiting free riding in water and negative externalities in 
sanitation); providers face the threat of emergent private sector competition (thus limiting petty corruption) and 
top-down performance pressures (thus limiting shirking of duties); and government (and the relatively strong, 
centralised ruling party) faces real threats to its legitimacy (thus limiting high-level corruption). Hence, the sectors 
‘work’ as a whole because there is a relatively stable equilibrium in place, whereby the needs of each of the key 
groups of actors are sufficiently served by the system for it to be able to sustain itself, while threats to this 
equilibrium have been controlled to avoid undermining it entirely.” (Mcloughlin and Harris 2013, p18). How far 
the example is comparable to Indonesia’s local scale service sector would need to be considered in the round. It is 
nonetheless apparent that in Colombo, the room for manoeuvre for technical staff to push back against politicians 
and superiors (who may have any eye to the political advantage of visible new infrastructure) is in part assisted by 
having robust monitoring arrangements, supported by civil society, that can highlight the externalised costs 
incurred by society and environment. 
 
 
 
